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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Nicholas David Johnson, a.k.a. Meeks, appeals from the district court’s summary 
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals offered the following factual background in the 
underlying criminal case: 
Johnson was charged with murder in the second degree for the 
stabbing death of Jarmey McCane at the home of Bill and Stacy Kron on 
June 25, 2011. The stabbing occurred at the end of a party where alcohol 
had been consumed by the persons present. At trial, testimony of the 
witnesses to the event showed that McCane, along with his sister and 
brother-in-law, Stacy and Raymond Lopez, arrived while the party was in 
progress at the Krons’s house. When McCane arrived, Bill Kron 
introduced him to Johnson as a “good dude,” to which Johnson 
responded, “Nah.” Stacy Kron testified that she could feel tension 
immediately when McCane was introduced to Johnson. Off and on 
through the evening, Johnson continued to say things to McCane, and 
McCane would just try to “blow it off” by saying, “Whatever, dude.” At one 
point, Kron moved between Johnson and McCane and held Johnson back 
from a confrontation with McCane. Johnson continued to engage in this 
behavior and display animosity toward McCane despite being asked by 
Kron to stop and “show some respect” to Kron’s guests. Around 1:30 a.m., 
Kron decided he was “done with the situation,” so he went to his room, 
“grabbed a bat,” and “told everybody the party ... was over.” Stacy Kron 
took the bat from him, put it in the garage, and everyone went outside. 
They were standing in the street in front of the house, except for Johnson 
who had stayed on the front porch. Kron apologized to the Lopezes and to 
McCane and McCane apologized to Kron for disrespecting Kron and his 
home. 
 
While Kron was in the street apologizing to his friends, Johnson 
went back inside the Krons’s house and picked up a large kitchen knife 
with an eight-inch long blade, which he concealed in his pocket. Johnson 
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returned to the porch and yelled something in a “cocky” tone to which 
McCane responded, “What?” and started walking toward Johnson. As 
soon as McCane reached Johnson, Johnson stabbed McCane in the 
upper chest. McCane grabbed his neck and said, “I think I just got 
stabbed.” He collapsed in the Krons’s front yard and died. After the 
stabbing, Johnson fled to his truck. McCane’s brother-in-law, Raymond 
Lopez, pursued Johnson on foot and punched out the driver’s side window 
of Johnson’s vehicle, but Johnson sped away. Johnson fled to his 
girlfriend’s house, changed his bloody shirt, and approximately twenty 
minutes later, called 911 to report the stabbing. Unbeknownst to him, 
Raymond Lopez had already called 911. When Johnson called 911, he 
reported he just stabbed someone, claiming “two people came at [him] 
and tried to jump [him]” so he “grabbed a knife and stuck one.” When 
asked for his name, Johnson identified himself as “George Hernandez,” 
and when asked where he was, Johnson hung up. The dispatcher then 
called back, but Johnson did not answer his phone and the dispatcher got 
Johnson’s voicemail, which said, “Hey this is Nick.” The dispatcher called 
back a second time and Johnson answered. When the dispatcher asked, 
“Is this George?” Johnson calmly said, “Yes,” and he repeated his story 
that he “stuck” a guy when two men tried to jump him. Johnson also 
denied knowing the victim, said he was not sure whether the homeowner 
knew the victim, and said he did not plan to go to jail. When the dispatcher 
asked whether Johnson was planning to harm himself, he said “hold on” 
and hung up. 
 
Law enforcement eventually located Johnson in his truck and 
initiated a traffic stop. The officers observed that Johnson’s driver’s side 
window was shattered, there was blood spatter in his truck, and the bloody 
knife was on the front seat mostly covered by a piece of paper. Johnson 
was taken into custody at which time it was noted he had no visible 
injuries and he declined an offer to be examined by paramedics. When 
interviewed, Johnson again claimed he had been attacked by two guys 
and said he had the knife because he felt threatened. 
 
The State charged Johnson with second degree murder. Prior to 
trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking the admission of 
photographs taken concerning the crime scene, the victim, and the 
autopsy. Johnson objected to several of the photographs on the basis that 
the probative value of the photographs was outweighed by prejudicial 
effect. The district court explained that its decision on the admissibility of 
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the items was a discretionary call and ruled that one of the photos was 
admissible but that the court would reserve ruling on the admissibility of 
the others to see “how the facts of the case are going to tie in.” During 
trial, the court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury at which the 
forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy testified regarding the 
relevance of five photographs identified as Exhibits 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40. 
Johnson objected to these exhibits, arguing the photographs had 
significant prejudicial effect and had no probative value, in light of the fact 
that the defense was willing to stipulate to whatever facts the State wanted 
to put in the record about McCane’s autopsy. The court sustained 
Johnson’s objection to Exhibit 36, but allowed the admission of Exhibits 
37, 38, 39, and 40. 
 
The jury found Johnson guilty of second degree murder. The district 
court imposed a unified life sentence, with fifteen years fixed. Johnson 
filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. Johnson filed a 
timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and the order 
denying his Rule 35 motion. 
 
State v. Johnson, Docket No. 39573, 2013 Unpublished Op. No. 737, pp.2-4 (Idaho 
App., November 1, 2013).  The Court of Appeals affirmed both Johnson’s conviction 
and the order denying his Rule 35 motion.  Id. at 12. 
On December 17, 2013, Johnson filed two complementary motions for a new trial 
(R., pp.5-13) that, based on the content of the pleadings, the district court treated like a 
single petition for post-conviction relief (R., p.14).  The state filed a motion for summary 
dismissal of the petition on the grounds that it was not supported with evidence and was 
not verified.  (R., pp.27-30.)  With the assistance of counsel, Johnson filed an amended 
petition (R., pp.49-69), to which the state responded with an amended motion for 
summary dismissal (R., pp.422-39). 
The district court ultimately granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal (R., 
pp.475-500), and Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal (R., pp.502-04). 
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ISSUES 
Johnson states the issues on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it dismissed the petition for post[-]conviction 
relief without granting to the appellant an evidentiary hearing where he 
would have been able to produce evidence to support his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
 
Did the district court err when it did not follow clear precedent from the 
United States Supreme Court as to the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failure of counsel to inform the appellant that a plea agreement 
had been offered? 
 
Did the district court improperly dismiss the petition? 
 
Has the petitioner been denied the constructive assistance of counsel 
during the direct appeal process? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.I (capitalization standardized).) 
 
The state consolidates and rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Johnson failed to show error in the district court’s summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Johnson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Of His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
 
A. Introduction 
In his post-conviction petition, Johnson raised several interrelated claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  (R., pp.49-69.)  The state filed a motion for summary 
dismissal on the grounds that Johnson failed to present admissible evidence showing 
either deficient performance or prejudice in regards to any of his claims.  (R., pp.422-
39.)  The district court granted the state’s motion.  (R., pp.475-98.)  On appeal, Johnson 
argues that the district court erred by dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.2-15.)  Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this 
case, however, shows that summary dismissal was appropriate. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
….”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Johnson’s Post-Conviction Petition 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
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State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).  Generally, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief.  Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008).  However, unlike other civil 
complaints, in post-conviction cases the “application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1).”  Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)).  
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that “specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based.”  Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903).  “The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief on the trial court’s own initiative or in response to a party’s motion.  “To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  Thus, a 
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal “if the applicant’s 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of the petitioner’s 
claims.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.  While a court must accept a petitioner’s 
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s 
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mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s 
conclusions of law.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)).  The trial court is not required to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, 
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief.  Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).  “Allegations contained in the application are 
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of 
the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law.”  Id. 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel, he must show that his attorney’s performance was objectively deficient and 
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988).  To 
establish deficient performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong presumption 
that counsel’s performance was adequate and “show that his attorney’s conduct fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154, 
177 P.3d 362, 368 (2008) (citations omitted).  “[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be 
second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation.”  Id.  To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show “a reasonable 
probability that but for his attorney’s deficient performance the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. 
Articulating and applying relevant legal standards, in a very thorough order, the 
district court properly addressed and correctly dismissed each of Johnson’s post-
8 
conviction claims.  (See R., pp.475-98.)  The state adopts as part of its argument on 
appeal the district court’s detailed legal analysis found at pages 7-24 of its Order 
Granting Motion for Summary Dismissal, a copy of which is attached as “Appendix A.” 
In addition to asserting that the district court erred by dismissing his post-
conviction petition, Johnson claims on appeal that the district court’s notice of intent to 
dismiss failed to adequately inform him of defects in his petition, which prevented him 
from correcting those defects.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.12-15.)  Johnson’s argument 
fails, primarily, because the district court never filed a notice of intent to dismiss in this 
case.  As noted above, under Idaho Code § 19-4906, a district court may summarily 
dismiss a post-conviction petition—not only on its own initiative—but also in response to 
a party’s motion for summary dismissal.  See I.C. § 19-4906(c).  In this case, the district 
court did not dismiss Johnson’s petition on its own motion, which would have required 
the notice and 20 days to reply, see I.C. § 19-4906(b); instead, it granted the state’s 
motion to dismiss.  (See R., p.481.) 
Where the district court grants a party’s motion for summary dismissal under 
subsection (c), there is no 20-day notice requirement because the motion itself serves 
as the notice.  Workman, 144 Idaho 518, 524, 164 P.3d 798, 804 (citing Saykhamchone 
v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995)).  So long as the district court 
grants summary disposition on the same grounds asserted in the state’s motion, there is 
no additional notice requirement.  Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798.  
Though offering a more detailed analysis, the district court’s grounds for dismissal of 
Johnson’s petition were the same as those argued by the state.  (Compare R., pp.422-
39 with R., pp.475-98.)  Johnson was not entitled to additional notice. 
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Johnson also contends that the “Court did not inform the Appellant about the 
‘prongs’ of Strickland, Supra.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.14 (emphasis omitted).)  Contrary to 
Johnson’s assertion, the district court did cite the Strickland standard.  (R., p.482.)  
More importantly, because this is ultimately an issue of sufficient notice, the state cited 
the Strickland standard throughout its amended motion for summary dismissal.  (See 
R., pp.422-39.)  Johnson therefore had notice that he needed to present admissible 
evidence showing a material issue of fact regarding both deficient performance and 
resultant prejudice, in accordance with Strickland, to survive summary dismissal. 
Finally, Johnson complains that he was denied the “constructive assistance of 
counsel” during his direct appeal, because it is the policy of the State Appellate Public 
Defender to defer claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to post-conviction 
proceedings.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)  Johnson never presented this claim to the 
district court in his petition for post-conviction relief.  He therefore failed to preserve this 
claim and it should not be addressed on appeal.  See Hoover v. Hunter, 150 Idaho 658, 
663-64, 249 P.3d 851, 856-57 (2011). 
Even had Johnson properly preserved this claim, it would still fail.  The SAPD’s 
policy is not without merit.  As the Court of Appeals has noted, “[a] claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is an issue rarely appropriate on direct appeal from a judgment of 
conviction; rather it is usually reserved for post-conviction relief proceedings, where a 
more complete evidentiary record can be developed.”  State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 
433, 34 P.3d 1110, 1116 (Ct. App. 2001).  First, the record is rarely adequate for review 
of such claims, which generally involve complex factual determinations of competency.  
See State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549-50, 989 P.2d 288, 291-92 (Ct. App. 1999).  
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Second, an adverse decision after a review on the merits would become res judicata, 
thereby barring the claim in a subsequent post-conviction action.  State v. Mitchell, 124 
Idaho 374, 375-76, 859 P.2d 972, 973-74 (Ct. App. 1993).  In fact, “appellate counsel 
may do their clients a disservice by attempting to present such claims in an appeal from 
the criminal judgment, where the claims cannot be sustained on the existing record.”  
Saxton, 133 Idaho at 550, 989 P.2d at 292.  Even with the opportunity in post-conviction 
to develop the facts underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Johnson was 
still unable to sustain that claim; the prudent policy of the SAPD did not deprive him of 
the “constructive assistance of counsel” on appeal. 
Johnson has failed to show error in the district court’s order summarily dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief.  The district court’s order should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
summarily dismissing Johnson’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 1st day of July, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of July, 2016, caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United 
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 NICHOLAS DAVID JOHNSON AKA MEEKS 
 INMATE #102304 
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      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_ 
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CANYON COUHTY CL~fll< 
AANElERSElN: BEPl:1Tf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
NICHOLAS DAVID JOHNSON 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. CV-13-12087 
vs. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Defendants. 
Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder following a trial and sentenced 
to a unified life sentence, with 15 years fixed in State v. Nicholas David Johnson, aka 
Nicholas David Meeks, Canyon County case CR-2011-17691. He filed an appeal 
challenging whether the district court erred in admitting several autopsy photographs, 
erred in imposing an excessive sentence, and in denying an Idaho Criminal Rule (Rule 
35) motion. The conviction, sentence, and order denying the Rule 35 motion were 
affirmed on appeal in State v. Johnson, 2013 WL 5915000. 
The facts of the case are set forth in that Opinion and copied herein: 
Johnson was charged with murder in the second degree for the 
stabbing death of Jarmey Mccane at the home of Bill and Stacy Kron on 
June 25, 2011. The stabbing occurred at the end of a party where alcohol 
had been consumed by the persons present. At trial, testimony of the 
witnesses to the event showed that McCane, along with his sister and 
brother-in-law, Stacy and Raymond Lopez, arrived while the party was in 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL • 1 
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progress at the Krons's house. When McCane arrived, Bill Kron introduced 
him to Johnson as a "good dude," to which Johnson responded, "Nah." 
Stacy Kron testified that she could feel tension immediately when Mccane 
was introduced to Johnson. Off and on through the evening, Johnson 
continued to say things to Mccane, and Mccane would just try to "blow it 
off" by saying, "Whatever, dude." At one point, Kron moved between 
Johnson and Mccane and held Johnson back from a confrontation with 
Mccane. Johnson continued to engage in this behavior and display 
animosity toward McCane despite being asked by Kron to stop and "show 
some respect" to Kron's guests. Around 1 :30 a.m., Kron decided he was 
"done with the situation," so he went to his room, "grabbed a bat," and 
"told everybody the party ... was over." Stacy Kron took the bat from him, 
put it in the garage, and everyone went outside. They were standing in the 
street in front of the house, except for Johnson who had stayed on the 
front porch. Kron apologized to the Lopezes and to Mccane and Mccane 
apologized to Kron for disrespecting Kron and his home. 
While Kron was in the street apologizing to his friends, Johnson 
went back inside the Krons's house and picked up a large kitchen knife 
with an eight-inch long blade, which he concealed in his pocket. Johnson 
returned to the porch and yelled something in a "cocky" tone to which 
Mccane responded, "What?" and started walking toward Johnson. As 
soon as Mccane reached Johnson, Johnson stabbed Mccane in the 
upper chest. Mccane grabbed his neck and said, "I think I just got 
stabbed." He collapsed in the Krons's front yard and died. After the 
stabbing, Johnson fled to his truck. McCane's brother-in-law, Raymond 
Lopez, pursued Johnson on foot and punched out the driver's side window 
of Johnson's vehicle, but Johnson sped away. Johnson fled to his 
girlfriend's house, changed his bloody shirt, and approximately twenty 
minutes later, called 911 to report the stabbing. Unbeknownst to him, 
Raymond Lopez had already called 911. When Johnson called 911, he 
reported he just stabbed someone, claiming "two people came at [him] 
and tried to jump [him]" so he "grabbed a knife and stuck one." When 
asked for his name, Johnson identified himself as "George Hernandez," 
and when asked where he was, Johnson hung up. The dispatcher then 
called back, but Johnson did not answer his phone and the dispatcher got 
Johnson's voicemail, which said, "Hey this is Nick." The dispatcher called 
back a second time and Johnson answered. When the dispatcher asked, 
"Is this George?" Johnson calmly said, "Yes," and he repeated his story 
that he "stuck" a guy when two men tried to jump him. Johnson also 
denied knowing the victim, said he was not sure whether the homeowner 
knew the victim, and said he did not plan to go to jail. When the dispatcher 
asked whether Johnson was planning to harm himself, he said "hold on" 
and hung up. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 2 
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Law enforcement eventually located Johnson in his truck and 
initiated a traffic stop. The officers observed that Johnson's driver's side 
window was shattered, there was blood spatter in his truck, and the bloody 
knife was on the front seat mostly covered by a piece of paper. Johnson 
was taken into custody at which time it was noted he had no visible 
injuries and he declined an offer to be examined by paramedics. When 
interviewed, Johnson again claimed he had been attacked by two guys 
and said he had the knife because he felt threatened. 
State v. Johnson, No. 39573, 2013 WL 5915000, at *1-2 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 1, 
2013). 
Petitioner timely filed a motion in the criminal case, entitled "Amended Motion for 
New Trial Based on New Evidence." Based on the content of that motion, the Court 
treated it like a petition for post-conviction relief, appointed counsel and gave Petitioner 
time to amend the petition. Petitioner retained private counsel on January 23, 2014, 
and after the time for amending the petition had passed, the State filed an Answer and a 
Motion for Summary Dismissal. Counsel for Petitioner then filed a motion asking for an 
additional 90 days to amend the Petition. The Court granted the request in part, giving 
counsel an additional 60 days to amend the Petition. At the expiration of that 60 days, 
counsel again requested an additional 60 days for the petition, alleging it had taken 
more than 30 days to get a copy of the trial transcript from the Office of the State 
Appellate Public Defender, and because he had recently hired a private investigator to 
work on the case. The Court granted an additional 30 days to get the petition amended. 
Counsel requested a hearing on the Court's decision and the Court granted an 
additional extension, with the Amended Petition, signed by counsel, filed August 26, 
2014. A verification was filed September 12, 2014. 
Attached to the Amended Petition were three (3) affidavits. The first was from Kevin 
Kelley, a neighbor, who testified that the statement he made to the police accurately 
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represents what he told the officers. The police report indicates that Kevin Kelley told 
the officers he heard raised voices the night of the stabbing. The second affidavit is from 
Lori Kelley, Kevin Kelley's wife, who testified that the statement she made to the police 
accurately represents what she told the officers. In her statement, she told the officers 
she heard a loud disturbance at about 2:00 in the morning the night of the stabbing. The 
third affidavit was from Stephanie O'Donnell, the Petitioner's girlfriend, who testified that 
the Petitioner showed up at her apartment after the stabbing covered in blood, that she 
told him to call the police, and that the text on his phone that was sent prior to the 
stabbing from him to her, that said, "Eff no, I'm fighting right now," referred not to his 
fight with the victim before the stabbing, but instead, was a reference to an on-going 
disagreement between Stephanie and the Petitioner. 
The Petition contained the following causes of action: 
1. The Cumulative Deficient Performance Of Trial Counsel Prejudiced The 
Petitioner And Deprived Him Of Effective Assistance Of Counsel 
2. The Cumulative Effect of the Deficient Performance Deprived Petitioner of 
the Effective Assistance of Counsel 
3. The Petition Should Be Granted Due To The Existence Of Material Facts 
Not Previously Presented Or Heard 
The Petitioner also alleges the following, without distinguishing to which Claim 
the particular allegation applies: 
a. Trial counsel failed to convey a plea offer to the Petitioner; 
b. Trial counsel waived the preliminary hearing without the consent of 
Petitioner; 
c. Trial counsel failed to investigate Stephanie O'Donnell as a 
witness, who would substantiate his testimony that he went to her 
apartment and the two of them discussed calling the police 
because the victim would need help. O'Donnell would also have 
provided testimony confirming that the Petitioner had requested 
that she come pick him up from the party and would have testified 
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regarding the context for the text message sent by the Petitioner in 
the minutes preceding the stabbing; 
d. Trial counsel did not give Petitioner a copy of the discovery, which 
limited Petitioner's abillty to prepare a defense; 
e. Trial counsel spent four (4) hours with the Petitioner preparing for 
the trial despite requests by the Petitioner to meet; 
f. Trial counsel did not investigate the facts and did not call any 
witnesses except the defendant. Had he investigated, he would 
have been able to call Kevin and Lori Kelley, in addition to 
Stephanie O'Donnell; 
g. Trial counsel did not conduct effective voir dire, only asking 3 
questions, resulting in a selected juror coming forward during the 
trial to disclose the juror's father had been killed in a robbery 
approximately 42 years before the trial in this case; 
h. Trial counsel failed to object to the following statements in opening 
argument: 
i. "This is a case about winning at all costs, even if it means 
using a 13-inch kitchen knife and striking an ambush. On 
June 251h, 2011 at 2:10 in the morning, the defendant invited 
Jarmey Mccane to his death;" 
ii. "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when the defendant went 
back into that house, when he picked up that knife, he was 
giving himself an advantage to win a fight;" 
i. Trial counsel failed to object to the testimony of Melinda 
Chynoweth, the 9-1-1 dispatch operator as hearsay evidence, when 
Chynoweth testified that there was a hang-up 9-1-1 call, with the 
person on the other end identifying himself as "Mr. Hernandez," and 
indicating that he had stabbed someone; 
j. Trial counsel failed to object to the testimony of Vickie DeGuess, 
the coroner, who testified about photographs of the victim in a body 
bag and identified the person in the body bag as the victim, without 
any foundation about the victim's identity or DeGuess' knowledge 
of the identity, thus resulting in inadmissible hearsay; 
k. Trial counsel failed to object to statements made by Officer Patrick 
Lewis, where Lewis testified that Stacy Lopez, the victim's sister, 
stated, 
i. "Help him. He is my little brother. He only has two kids," as 
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial; 
ii. " ... it was his [Kron's) fault his friend stabbed her brother" as 
no foundation had been laid that there was a stabbing and it 
was up to the jury to determine whether a stabbing occurred; 
I. Trial counsel, by failing to object, failed to preserve any issues for 
appellate review; 
m. Trial counsel failed to object to the testimony of Officer Richard 
Pelkey, where Pelkey presented "hearsay" testimony when Pelkey 
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testified that Raymond Lopez was yelling at William Kron, " ... about 
how his friend had stabbed Jarmey;" 
n. Trial counsel failed to object to the testimony of Officer Richard 
Pelkey, where Pelkey presented "hearsay" testimony when Pelkey 
testified that Stacy Lopez was yelling at Bill that " ... his friend had 
done this;" 
o. Failed to object when Pelkey testified that Stacy Kron told him she 
was missing a knife from her butcher block; 
p. Trial counsel failed to cross examine Officer Pelkey; 
q. Trial counsel failed to object to the admission of Exhibits 14 and 15, 
which were photos of the butcher block and knife set; 
r. Failed to object to testimony from Officer Michael Clinger that when 
the Petitioner was stopped by the police after the stabbing, the 
officers treated it as a "high risk stop," as that statement was not 
relevant and was highly prejudicial, as it implied the defendant was 
violent, armed, and a danger to the officers; 
s. Trial counsel failed to object to the district court improperly assisting 
the state in admitting exhibits; 
t. The district court improperly assisted the state in admitting 
exhibits; 
u. Trial counsel failed to object to the testimony of Paul Weremecki 
about Weremecki's conversations with the Petitioner prior to the 
stabbing, wherein the Petitioner was bragging about his ability to 
beat people up, as this was irrelevant; 
v. Trial counsel failed to object to the state's leading questions to Bill 
Kron, after Kron had already testified he didn't really remember 
what had happened; 
w. Trial counsel failed to object to Ray Lopez' testimony that the 
Petitioner stabbed the victim, when all Lopez saw was the 
Petitioner swing his arm and didn't see a weapon because the 
stabbing was a "legal" conclusion the jury should have made; 
x. Trial counsel failed to object to State's questioning of Stacy Lopez, 
when after she became emotional, the State asked, "Is it hard to be 
in the same room with the person who killed your brother?" This 
was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. 
The State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal asserting that as to each claim, 
the Petitioner failed to support each prong of the Strickland test with admissible 
evidence. The State also generally alleged that Petitioner failed to raise genuine issues 
of material fact, failed to provide admissible evidence for each claim, failed to establish 
either deficient performance or prejudice, and that "most" claims failed as Petitioner had 
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not established the act was the result of deficient performance as opposed to trial 
strategy. The State also argued that the claim for newly discovered evidence did not 
meet the legal standard. The State also addresses some claims specifically. 
Based on the Amended Petition, the affidavits, the items of which the Court took 
judicial notice and the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, the Court hereby 
GRANTS the State's Motion for Summary. 
A petition for post-conviction relief must contain much more than a short and 
plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1)."' 
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008). "The application must 
present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the 
application will be subject to dismissal." Id. at 561, 199 P.3d at 136 (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). Idaho Code§ 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court's own 
initiative. The standard for analyzing the motion for summary dismissal is "whether a 
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions 
together with any affidavits on file." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 
929 (2010). 
"[l]f the petitioner's alleged facts are uncontroverted by the State ... [they] 
must be regarded as true." However, summary dismissal may be 
appropriate even where the State does not controvert the applicant's 
evidence because the court is not required to accept either the applicant's 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the 
applicant's conclusions of law. 
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 674-75, 227 P.3d 925, 928-29 (2010) (internal citations 
omitted. 
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To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), 
the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient 
and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency." Id. "To prove 
deficient performance, the appellant 'must show the attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' " State 
v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, _, 313 P.3d 1, 39 (2013) (quoting Dunlap v. 
State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376,385 (2004)). 
"To demonstrate prejudice, the appellant 'must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome 
of the trial would have been different.' " Id. "A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 563 U.S._,_, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). To undermine confidence in the outcome 
"requires a 'substantial,' not just 'conceivable,' likelihood of a different 
result." Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S._,_, 131 S.Ct. 770, 
791 (2011 )) .... 
Under the Strickland standard, counsel is "strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment." 
Murray v. State, 2014 Opinion No. 31, p.6 (March 19, 2014). 
Further: 
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, strategic and 
tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as a basis for post-
conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000). 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149 P.3d 833, 836 (2006). 
Finally, 
Effective legal representation does not require that an attorney object to 
admissible evidence. Indeed, if evidence is arguably admissible, and the 
trial court could have properly allowed the evidence even if counsel had 
objected, the counsel's performance generally will not be objectively 
deficient. Thus, the standard for deficient performance when dealing with 
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a failure to object is not whether the testimony could have been excluded, 
but whether the testimony could have been properly admitted. Failing to 
object to arguably inadmissible testimony will generally be insufficient to 
overcome the presumption that the decision was based on sound legal 
strategy. If the testimony could not have been properly admitted, then it 
can be reasonably inferred, absent evidence to the contrary, that the 
attorney's failure to object was the product of ignorance of the relevant law 
governing admissibility of the testimony. Accordingly, in order to determine 
if counsel's failure to object fell below an objectively reasonable standard 
of performance, we must first determine whether the testimony could have 
properly been admitted without error by the trial court. 
Cook v. State, No. 41449, 2014 WL 4290413, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2014) 
(internal citations omitted.) 
Petitioner Has Not Established Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The Petitioner is required to set forth facts that either allege or establish prejudice 
resulting from counsel's alleged deficient performance. See Murillo v. State, 144 Idaho 
449, 455, 163 P.3d 238, 244 (Ct. App. 2007). In the underlying criminal case, defense 
counsel's strategy was to raise a claim of self-defense. (Tr, 10/25/11, p.10, Ls. 1-9; Tr. 
P. 392, Ls. 14-18). "A claim of self-defense may be either justifiable or excusable, 
either of which entitles defendant to acquittal. 'Justifiable' homicide in self-defense 
occurs when a defendant, without provoking the confrontation, kills another under a 
reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily harm to the defendant." 40 Am. Jur. 
2d Homicide § 138. In this case, defendant was not challenging that he caused the 
death of Jarmey McCane by acting with malice aforethought; instead, he was asserting 
that the death was legally justified or excused based on his claim of self-defense. Any 
error relating to the identity of the victim, the method or manner of death or whether 
Petitioner was the one who caused the death of the victim were all elements of second 
degree murder that Petitioner necessarily admitted in order to assert the claim of self-
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defense. That this was trial counsel's strategy is reflected in the transcripts and in the 
jury instructions (Final Jury Instruction Nos. 15 and 23). 
In the assertions above, assertions c, i, j, k, m, n, o, p, q, v, and w are all claims 
that fail to establish deficient performance because each of those claims go to the 
identity of the Petitioner as the killer, the manner or method of death or the identity of 
the victim. Failing to challenge these statements was consistent with trial counsel's 
theory of defense - that Petitioner had caused the death of the victim with malice 
aforethought but that the killing was done in self-defense. Failing to cross-examine or 
challenge the elements of the underlying crime was consistent with the strategy of trial 
counsel and therefore, that strategy will not be second-guessed on post-conviction 
where there is no evidence of inadequate preparation or ignorance of the relevant law. 
As such, there is no deficient performance nor is there any prejudice to the defendant 
and the State's Motion is GRANTED as to these claims 1. 
Plaintiff Has Failed To Support His Claims With Admissible Evidence 
In assertion a, Plaintiff alleges his attorney failed to convey a plea offer. While 
failing to convey a plea offer may constitute deficient performance, see Missouri v. Frye, 
132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed. 379 (2012), in order to establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the Petitioner must show both that a plea offer was extended by the State, and 
that Petitioner would have accepted the plea offer. Id. at 1409. Here, Petitioner fails to 
1 
"Where the dismissal is based upon the grounds offered by the State, additional notice 
is unnecessary. When a trial court summarily dismisses an application for post-
conviction relief based in part on the arguments presented by the State, this is sufficient 
to meet the notice requirements [of I.C. § 19-4906(b))." Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 
523,236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010) (internal citation omitted.) 
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provide any admissible evidence about the contents of the plea offer, when it was made 
or that he would have accepted it. As such, because he has not supported his claim 
with admissible evidence, the State's motion is GRANTED as to this claim. 
In assertion b, although Petitioner claims the preliminary hearing was waived 
without his consent; that claim is belied by the record where Petitioner, himself, waives 
the preliminary hearing. He has not alleged, by admissible evidence, that the waiver 
was invalid. Additionally, he has not established any prejudice resulting from the waiver 
because any claims of proof deficiencies in the preliminary hearing are waived by 
exercising the right to have a trial, (see State v. Streeper, 113 Idaho 662, 665, 747 P.2d 
71, 75 (1987) ("Judgment will not be overturned for defects in proof at preliminary 
hearing where, at a fair trial, accused is found guilty upon sufficient evidence to sustain 
a verdict."), which Petitioner had. He has not alleged which, if any, witness testimony 
was different from the preliminary hearing or the trial. It appears the only witness who 
deviated from a previous statement was Raymond Lopez, and trial counsel cross-
examined Lopez about the difference or change in his testimony as compared to his 
previous statement. Finally, Petitioner has not established how his trial strategy - a 
claim of self-defense - was prejudiced by the waiver of the preliminary hearing. As 
such, because Petitioner has not supported his claim with admissible evidence, the 
State's motion is GRANTED as to this claim. 
In assertion c, Petitioner alleges that his attorney rendered deficient performance in 
failing to call Stephanie O'Donnell, and that the failure to call her prejudiced the 
Petitioner because there was no one to corroborate his statements regarding a text 
message. The Petitioner testified that no one was fighting when Bill Kron got his 
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baseball bat and made everyone leave the Kron residence. He testified that he thought 
he had made a statement to the police officers that no one was fighting. The state then 
asked him if he sent a text message to Stephanie at 2:03 a.m. saying that he was 
fighting. Petitioner said that he sent a text message to her saying he was done fighting 
with her. The state asked him, "On June 25th isn't it true that at 2:03 in the morning you 
sent a text message to Stephanie that said, quote, "Fuck you, asshole. I'm fighting right 
now?" The Petitioner testified that he didn't mean to send it, he was intoxicated and 
maybe he mis-typed or left out some words. (Tr., 11/7-0/11, p.646, Ls.12-15). 
Stephanie O'Donnell provided an affidavit indicating that she and the Petitioner 
had been arguing about whether she would be able to get to the party and that when he 
texted the term, "fighting," it referred to the verbal argument between the two of them. 
She also testified that later that morning, the Petitioner showed up at her house wearing 
a bloody shirt and called the police while the two of them were in his truck. She also 
testified that no one asked her about the phone or the text messages. 
Others testified at trial that there was some tension between the Petitioner and 
the victim that began as soon as the two were introduced and that throughout the night, 
the two were trading verbal jabs, characterizing the exchanges as "guy talk." No one 
saw any physical altercation between the two the entire evening. All the witnesses 
testified that after Bill Kron kicked everyone out of the house, Petitioner yelled 
something to the victim, who was standing in the street. The victim walked quickly up 
the sidewalk to the patio where Petitioner was. The next thing everyone noticed was 
the victim stepping off the patio with his shirt covered in blood and the Petitioner leaving 
with the knife. 
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Even if it was deficient performance not to call Stephanie O'Donnell as a witness, 
Petitioner has failed to establish by admissible evidence a reasonable probability the 
outcome of the case would have been different. Stephanie's testimony would have only 
confirmed what everyone else had testified to - that there was no physical altercation 
between the two prior to the stabbing. Whether the fighting referred to the "verbal jabs," 
made to the victim or whether it referred to his argument with his girlfriend, there are no 
facts as alleged by the Petitioner that support a showing that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different; as such, the State's motion on this issue is GRANTED. 
Assertions d and e allege that because Petitioner wasn't given a copy of the 
discovery, Petitioner was unable to assist in his own defense. Similarly, he alleges that 
he only spent four ( 4) hours with his attorney. Petitioner does not allege that he did not 
get to review the discovery with his attorney, only that he did not get a copy of ii. Taking 
those facts as true, Petitioner has failed to allege by admissible evidence that having a 
copy of the discovery would have aided him in assisting his attorney prepare a self-
defense, thus he has not established he suffered any prejudice. Further, he does not 
establish how spending more time with his attorney would have resulted in a different 
outcome. Because Petitioner has not supported his claims with admissible evidence, 
the State's motion is GRANTED as to these claims. 
In assertion f, Petitioner alleges the attorney failed to investigate potential 
witnesses because two witnesses, Kevin and Lori Kelley, were not called. The Kelleys' 
affidavits reflect only that the police reports accurately reflect what the Kelleys told the 
officers. There is no independent, admissible evidence of the Kelley's testimony 
because their statements to the officers were not sworn testimony. Even if their 
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testimony was substantively the same as the police reports, the testimony only 
establishes that the Kelleys lived across the street from where the stabbing occurred 
and that at about 2:00 a.m., both could hear raised voices but could not see anyone 
fighting. 
Petitioner believes this would have established that there was a loud "boisterous 
exchange" that immediately preceded the stabbing instead of leaving unchallenged the 
State's assertion that there was no such occurrence. This misstates the evidence. The 
State never argued there was no "boisterous exchange" prior to the stabbing. 
The first 9-1-1 call about the stabbing came in at 2:12 a.m. In the 10 minutes 
before that, there was testimony that the Petitioner called loudly to the victim, who was 
standing in the street. Additionally the testimony revealed that following the stabbing, 
there were all kinds of loud noises; for example, Stacey and Raymond Lopez yelling 
and Stacey Lopez crying hysterically. Thus, because the Kelleys' testimony was 
consistent with the testimony given by the other witnesses it would not have 
"challenged" the other evidence. 
Like the other witnesses, the Kelleys' saw no physical altercation between the 
two or between anyone else, and heard loud noises either immediately preceding or 
immediately following the stabbing. Moreover, Petitioner has not established that had 
the Kelley's testimony been presented, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. 
Alternatively, Petitioner has not established that trial counsel did not interview the 
Kelley's or simply chose not to call either the Kelleys or O'Donell as witnesses; a trial 
strategy that will not be second-guessed in this case. In light of the nature of their 
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testimony, trial counsel's decision not to call the Kelleys or O'Donnell does not appear 
to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review. As such, because he has not supported his 
claim with admissible evidence, the State's motion is GRANTED as to this claim. 
Assertion g alleges that because trial counsel did not conduct a more extensive 
voir dire, a juror failed to disclose the juror's father was the victim of a robbery 
approximately 42 years before the trial in this case. Plaintiff fails to establish any factual 
basis that there was deficient performance or that he was prejudiced by this 
circumstance. After extensive questioning by the court and the State, if the juror had 
not remembered this event, there is no evidence in the record to establish the defense 
attorney's questioning would have triggered a response. Moreover, after the juror's 
disclosure, he was individually questioned by the Court with the attorneys present. The 
juror indicated that he believed he could be fair and impartial and thus, there was no 
basis to strike the juror for cause. See, State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 332 P.3d 767, 
775 (2014). Where trial counsel would not have been successful in his motion to strike 
for cause, there can be no deficient performance.2 Because Petitioner has not 
supported his claim with admissible evidence, the State's motion is GRANTED as to this 
claim. 
Claim h alleges trial counsel failed to object to certain statements in opening 
argument. The statements relate to the fact that the Petitioner was the person who 
caused the death of the victim. As noted above, given Petitioner's trial strategy, 
2 Petitioner does not allege that had the information been available during voir dire his 
attorney would have used one of his peremptory challenges to remove the potential 
juror. 
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Petitioner was not contesting the fact that he killed the victim; thus, Petitioner has not 
established deficient performance of trial counsel. Moreover, the jury was instructed 
that opening and closing statements were not evidence and should not be considered 
evidence for their determination. Petitioner has not provided any evidence that the jury 
disregarded the instructions and considered those statements during their deliberation; 
therefore, he has not established any prejudice as a result of the failure to object. 
Because he has not supported his claim with admissible evidence, the State's motion is 
GRANTED as to this claim. 
As to assertion k and i, to the extent it was not part of trial counsel's strategy, 
Petitioner has failed to establish how that one line of testimony constituted prejudice 
such that, had that particular statement been excluded from the trial, the outcome would 
have been different. There was overwhelming evidence that Petitioner stabbed Jarmey 
Mccane and that Mccane died as a result of the wounds. There was also 
overwhelming evidence that McCane was not carrying a weapon and was stabbed 
before any aggressive physical gestures were made by Mccane towards the Petitioner. 
As such, there is not a reasonable probablility the outcome would have been different 
had trial counsel objected and the objection were sustained. Because Petitioner has 
not supported his claim with admissible evidence, the State's motion is GRANTED as to 
these claims. 
Although Petitioner claims in allegation I that his attorney failed to preserve 
issues for appeal, he fails to identify what issues should have been preserved and the 
likelihood of success of those claims in order to establish prejudice. As such, he has 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL • 16 
Ann 
• • 
failed to support his claim with admissible evidence and the State's motion on this claim 
is GRANTED. 
As to assertion r, Petitioner's claim is that testifying that this was a "high risk 
stop" was unduly prejudicial because it "implied the defendant was violent, armed, and a 
danger to the officers." Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides, "Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue cielay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." Evidence is unduly prejudicial if "it tends to suggest decision on an improper 
basis." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 397-98, 3 P.3d 67, 75-76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
While the type of stop was arguably not relevant and so an objection might have 
been sustained, Petitioner has not established any prejudice as a result of trial 
counsel's failure to object. Petitioner has not included any admissible evidence that 
three sentences (Tr., p.319, Ls. 19, 21, 23) resulted in jurors believing that he was 
armed, dangerous and violent at the time of the stop. There was no testimony at trial 
about when there is a high risk stop, the kind of crime or information that would give rise 
to the crime. The officers testified that when there is a high risk stop, they have the 
driver turn off the car and have the people in the car get out of the car one at a time. 
(Tr., p.319, L.18-p.20, L.11). 
Moreover, this testimony was not unduly prejudicial. The defendant was 
identified to the officers as having committed a stabbing and was seen leaving with the 
murder weapon. The jurors already had heard and were going to hear from other 
witnesses that the Petitioner was armed at the time of the stabbing, that he was violent 
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and could reasonably infer that he was dangerous. While the statement was prejudicial, 
it was not unduly prejudicial in the context of the trial and even had an objection been 
sustained, the erroneous admission of those three sentences does not lead to a 
conclusion there was a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different. 
Therefore, the State's motion is GRANTED as to this claim. 
For claims s and t, the Petitioner's claims are not supported by the record. The 
Court did not assist the State in admitting evidence. At the relevant time in the trial, Dr. 
Deters, who performed the autopsy, was going to be called as a State's witness. There 
were some photographs of the autopsy the State was seeking to admit. These were 
also the photographs addressed in the pre-trial conference. The photo at issue was a 
depiction of the victim's chest, where the ribcage had either been removed or pulled 
apart and the Court ruled that it would allow that photograph only to show the depth of 
the wound. What the Court said is as follows: 
The Court: Just as a heads up, you may want to have an - I mean, that one 
photo, when I - you know, where the chest is pulled open and it 
shows it, I mean, if the only point's going to be the depth, I'll let you 
lay the foundation. Make sure you have a backup, like, okay 
something else can show the length or whatever." 
(Tr., 11/7-10/2011, p.366, Ls. 1-7). This is not assisting the State in admitting an 
exhibit. Rather, the Court was explaining to the State, much like a motion in limine, that 
should the appropriate foundation be established, the Court found the exhibit to be 
relevant and the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect of the exhibit. 
Because the Court was not assisting the State in admitting the evidence, that could not 
be a basis for trial counsel to object, and so there is no deficient performance or 
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prejudice established. Because the claims are not supported by admissible evidence, 
the State's motion is GRANTED as to these claims. 
As to claim u, Petitioner's state of mind at the time of the stabbing and 
preceding the stabbing was relevant. Self-defense includes both an objective 
component (would a reasonable person have believed he was in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily harm) and a subjective belief (the defendant believed he was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm). Petitioner was 5'10" and testified he 
weighed 160 pounds3; the victim was 6'2" and just under 250 pounds. Weremecki, 
another attendee at the party, had fought professionally. 4 The testimony revealed 
Petitioner had spent time in the gym trying to build bigger muscles, was pleased with 
how "big" he had gotten and was bragging to Weremecki about Petitioner's own ability 
to fight, and win, against other people who had bested Weremecki n his professional 
career. (Tr., 11/7-10/11, P.446, L. 20-p.448, L.8.) State's Exhibits 30, 32 and 33, which 
were admitted at trial, and of which the Court has taken judicial notice, are photographs 
of the Petitioner and depict him as a fit and muscular individual at the time of the 
stabbing. Thus, Petitioner's behavior or comments bragging about how tough he was or 
how he could beat people up, would be relevant to establishing whether Petitioner 
believed he was in imminent danger when McCane walked towards him immediately 
preceding the stabbing. As such, the testimony was relevant and because it was 
relevant and not unduly prejudicial, there would have been no grounds to object to the 
testimony and thus, Petitioner has failed to establish deficient performance for failing to 
3 It is not clear whether that was his weight at the time of trial or at the time of the killing. 
4 It is not entirely clear from the transcript what kind of professional fighter Weremecki 
was, but it appears it was Mixed Martial Arts. 
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object to the testimony. Petitioner has failed to support his claim with admissible 
evidence and the State's motion is GRANTED as to this claim. 
In claim x, Petitioner alleges that his attorney failed to object to the State's 
questioning of Stacy Lopez, when during her testimony, she became emotional and the 
State then asked, "Is it hard to be in the same room with the person who killed your 
brother?" The Court finds that this was deficient performance, as the question was not 
relevant. However, the Petitioner has not established by admissible evidence any 
prejudice resulting from this question in light of the other testimony presented at trial. At 
trial, at least one witness testified that Stacy Lopez was holding her brother in her arms 
when he died, that she was hysterical, she was trying to lay over his dead body and was 
very difficult to remove so that first responders and officers could perform their 
respective duties. Thus, the jury was already presented with the testimony that the 
death had been very hard on Stacey Lopez and that the Petitioner was the killer. 
While the question was irrelevant and perhaps prejudicial, the Court cannot find 
the statement is unduly prejudicial or that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different had the statement been excluded; as such, the Court grants the State's Motion 
on this claim. 
As to Petitioner's-entitled First Cause of Action, this Court is only able to find two 
potential errors by counsel as alleged by Petitioner- failing to object to the term "high 
risk" as it related to the stop, and failing to object to the question, ""Is it hard to be in the 
same room with the person who killed your brother?" as alleged in claim x. 
"Under the cumulative errors doctrine, an accumulation of irregularities, 
each of which might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate reveal the 
absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due 
process." State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 
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( 1994 ). For the cumulative error doctrine to apply there must have been 
more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407, 958 P.2d 22, 
33 (Ct.App.1998). 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,723,215 P.3d 414,443 (2009). 
Although Petitioner has established two potential errors, unless Petitioner can 
establish prejudice resulting from the errors, he cannot establish cumulative error. In 
this case, because the Court has found two instances of deficient performance, the 
Court must look at those two errors together to determine whether the result of the two 
errors deprived the Petitioner of a fair trial. 
As noted above, neither of the claims individually establish any prejudice. 
Similarly, the Petitioner has provided no argument or evidence establishing prejudice in 
light of aggregation of those two errors. Given the lack of argument or evidence, the 
Court cannot find that those errors deprived Petitioner of a fair trial given the context of 
the trial as a whole, the trial strategy and the nature and amount of testimony. As such, 
the Petitioner has failed to support his First Cause of Action by admissible evidence and 
' 
the State's Motion is therefore, GRANTED as to this claim. 
Similarly, in Cause of Action Two, Petitioner fails to identify or establish the 
deficient performance. In this case, there was overwhelming evidence that Petitioner 
engaged in conduct, with malice aforethought that caused the death of the victim. The 
jury rejected his claim of self-defense. At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, 
Petitioner's counsel argued that because there was no way Petitioner could establish 
the outcome of the trial would be different, he should be relieved from that requirement. 
Unfortunately, the law is clear - the Petitioner has the burden of establishing both the 
deficient performance and the resulting prejudice by admissible evidence. Without 
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providing evidence or argument regarding how the outcome would have been different, 
Petitioner has failed to establish any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, 
because he has not supported his claim with admissible evidence, the State's motion is 
GRANTED as to this claim. 
Finally, in his third cause of action the Petitioner alleges that there exists material 
facts not heard or presented which should result in a new trial being granted. The 
standard for evaluating a request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in 
post-conviction proceedings is the same as the standard for evaluating the request in a 
criminal proceeding. 
Before a new trial can be granted, and irrespective of the form of the 
request, new evidence must satisfy the four-part test set forth in State v. 
Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976): 
A motion based on newly discovered evidence must disclose (1) that the 
evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the 
time of trial; (2) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or 
impeaching; (3) that it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that 
failure to learn of the evidence was due in no part to lack of diligence on 
the part of the defendant. 
Whiteley v. State, 131 Idaho 323, 326, 955 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1998), citing State v. 
Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976). 
Here, the Petitioner does not articulate what the new and material facts are and 
the Court is not required to search the record to find the factual support for Petitioner's 
claims. As noted, there are only three affidavits attached to the Amended Petition -
those of Kevin Kelley, Lori Kelley, and Stephanie O'Donnell. There is no evidence in 
the record that establishes those witnesses, or their testimony, was unknown to the 
defendant at the time of trial. 
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The second element requires that the evidence be material and not cumulative or 
impeaching. A material fact is one that existed "at the time of [the trial] that would have 
been relevant to the [trial] process and that indicate[s) the information available to the 
parties or the trial court at the time of [trial] was false, incomplete, or otherwise 
materially misleading. Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 440, 163 P.3d 222, 229 (Ct. 
App. 2007). Here, the Petitioner alleges that the testimony of the Kelleys would 
establish there was some kind of loud noises, indicative of a verbal altercation, 
immediately preceding the stabbing. As previously discussed, this was cumulative -
other witnesses testified to the same thing. Additionally, Stephanie O'Donnell's 
testimony was simply corroborative of the Petitioner's testimony. Although Petitioner 
alleges that Stephanie O'Donnell's testimony would establish there was no "fight" of any 
kind with the victim immediately preceding the stabbing, Petitioner has not established 
by admissible evidence how that would be material when that only corroborates the 
testimony presented at trial - all the witnesses testified there was no physical fighting 
before the stabbing and that immediately before the stabbing, the Petitioner yelled 
something at the victim, who walked rapidly up the sidewalk to the Petitioner. This is 
not evidence that existed that was not presented to the jury. The only possible 
component of Stephanie O'Donnell's affidavit that might be considered a material fact5 
that was not presented to the jury was the explanation of the term ''fight" in the text 
message. Even assuming O'Donnell testified that Petitioner did not mean he was 
"fighting" with the victim before the stabbing, Petitioner cannot establish the third 
element - that piece of evidence would likely have produced an acquittal. Nor is there 
5 The Court notes that paragraphs 8 (after the first sentence), 9, and 11 of O'Donnell's 
affidavit are not material as they are irrelevant to the claims in the petition. 
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any evidence to establish the fourth element of the test. Thus, Petitioner has alleged no 
facts to support his claim that this was newly discovered evidence that warranted a new 
trial and the State's motion as to this claim is GRANTED. 
Additionally, Petitioner has not alleged any prejudice because he cannot 
establish that the statements of the Kelleys or the testimony of O'Donnell would have 
reasonably changed the outcome of the trial, particularly in light of the other testimony 
presented. Because he has failed to establish prejudice by admissible evidence, this is 
an alternative basis to dismiss the claim and the State's motion as to this claim is 
GRANTED. 
Conclusion 
Based on the above, the Court hereby GRANTS the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal and DISMISSES the Petition with prejudice. 
Dated this Cfy.J(-"- day of December, 2014. 
~\ uTu~AAJu,/' 
Molly J. Hus • 6 
District Judge 
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